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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
Introduction  
Cyber Physical Systems (CPSs) are at the core of Water 4.0. As water networks are upgraded to Smart Water Networks 
(SWNs), however, the number of potential entry points for malicious attackers grows. Therefore, there is a pressing 
need for mitigating the related risks using cyber and physical security frameworks. This pressing need is evidenced by 
the fact that Cyber-Physical System Security (CPSS) has attracted a lot of research attention in recent years. Examples 
of reported CPSs attacks are the ransomware attack in the city of Atlanta in March 2018 and the Ukraine attack in 
December 2015. Bearing this in mind, there are many other attacks that are expected to occur in SWNs such as 
compromising remote sites, hot pivots, cell-phone WIFI, Stuxnet, etc. [1]. A recent study [2] reported that, every sixty 
seconds, the cyber-crime costs more than $1.1 million and impacts more than 1,800 people along with affecting 
infrastructures and the services. 
SWNs are complex systems consisting of a physical layer of reservoirs, valves, pumps and pipes, among the others. 
According to the SWAN forum, the other SWN layers are: 1) sensing and control, 2) collection and communication, 3) 
data management and display and 4) data fusion and analysis. This paper reviews the potential attacks and prevention 
approaches with focus on each layer of the SWN architecture. The attacks and possible countermeasures are explained 
and references to relevant literature that has attempted to deal with these issues are provided. Moreover, the impact of 
these attacks on SWNs is discussed and recommendations for security procedures to be followed by water utilities are 
proposed. 
Cyber-Physical System Security Threats and Countermeasures for Smart Water Networks 
Different CPS threats and potential countermeasures are discussed in this section with focus on each layer of the SWN 
architecture (see Figure1) to provide guidance for water utilities when upgrading the current water infrastructure. 
In the physical and sensing and control layers, many attacks can occur that are directed to the physical devices (i.e., 
smart meters, water quality sensors, hydraulic sensors, PLC, etc.) and/or to the process of collecting the data from such 
devices. These attacks include, device tampering, fake (virtual) node injection, malicious code injection, sleep denial 
attacks and node jamming. Device tampering may occur when an attacker is physically close to the device and can 
replace part of the hardware to manipulate the data or to get the information inside the device (e.g., data, cryptographic 
key, communications channels, etc.). This threat can be mitigated by implementing secure and reliable physical design 
with alarming systems that can notify a water utility in the case of any tampering attempt [3]. Fake node injection may 
occur when an attacker succeeds in injecting a virtual node in the network which, in turn, enables the attacker to gain 
access to the network and control the flow of data. This threat can be mitigated by implementing a secure booting 
scheme which involves a lightweight physical layer authentication such as unclonable function [3] and weighted hash 
function cryptographic algorithms [4]. Malicious code injection may occur when the attacker can gain access to the 
network by attacking one of the nodes by Denial of Service (DoS) attacks of a virus which can expose the network 
resources. This threat cannot be easily mitigated as some of the nodes may not have the power and computational 
capabilities to stand against such attacks. However, putting the nodes in sleep mode in case of these attacks and 
intrusion detection technologies have been proposed for this threat. Sleep denial attacks may occur when the attacker 
manages to prevent the nodes from going sleep when not in service, which may result in shutting the nodes down. This 
threat can be mitigated by maintaining authentication and trust between devices in the node. Finally, node jamming may 
occur when the sensor get DoS following transmission of noise signals. This threat can be mitigated by implementing a 
Internet Protocol security (IPsec) channel which is a network protocol that can provide authentication and encryption of 
the transmitted data along with identifying the sender [5]. 
In the collection and communication (i.e. network) layer, there are several attacks that do not require the attacker to be 
physically at the location where the attack will take place. These attacks include: traffic analysis attack, sinkhole attack 
and Man In The Middle (MITM) attack. Traffic analysis attacks may occur when the attacker is able to obtain 
confidential information such as an employee’s authentication information. This threat can be mitigated by using secure 
 
17th International Computing & Control for the Water Industry Conference 
1-4 September 2019, Exeter, United Kingdom 
 
routing procedures such as routing through several paths. Sinkhole attacks involve the manipulation of one of the nodes 
to redirect the transmission signal to a different destination that can invalid data safety and result in dropping the 
information packets. The attacks that comes from outside the network can be secured using different techniques whilst 
attacks from inside the network can be secured using security aware ad-hoc routing protocol (SAR) [6]. Finally, MITM 
attacks may occur when the attacker can intercept restricted information. This threat can be mitigated using point-to-
point encryption techniques such hash functions [7] to ensure data integrity. 
 
Figure 1 Smart Water Network layers with the potential CPS attacks 
 
There are many other attacks and prevention techniques that focus on the data management and display and data fusion 
and analysis layers. Cloud application security, cloud data security, underlying IT infrastructure security, virtualization 
threats, phishing attacks, virus, worms, malicious attacks, software vulnerabilities are just a few examples. The majority 
of these threats/countermeasures are actively been mitigated/investigated using/by third parties such as google cloud, 
IBM, android things, and Microsoft azure. Therefore, third-party relationships require particular attention from water 
utilities to reduce the entry points for the attackers. High-level encryption such as advanced encryption standards [8]  
should be considered when storing or sending data. 
Recommendations and Conclusions 
CPSS is fundamental to enable Water 4.0 and SWNs. This paper has presented a brief review of the potential attacks 
and prevention approaches with focus on each layer of the SWN architecture. Based the these and on the impact of 
these attacks on SWNs it is possible to state that lightweight encryption and anomaly detection techniques need further 
investigation as the commercial Internet of Things (IoT) nodes may not be able to use the normal encryption and 
anomaly detection techniques due to the low processing and power capabilities. 
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